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CASE NOTES
AcT OF STATE DocTRmN -First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
In July 1958, First National City Bank loaned $15 million
to a predecessor of Banco Nacional de Cuba. United States
Government bonds were pledged as collateral.' By 1960, $5 mil-
lion had been repaid, and First National City had released
a corresponding amount of collateral.
Meanwhile, Fidel Castro had come to power in Cuba.
2
Implementation of his policies resulted in substantial expro-
priation of foreign-owned properties, including First National
City's Cuban banking branches on September 16, 1960.3 A week
later, the American bank sold the remaining collateral securing
the loan and applied the proceeds to principal and unpaid in-
terest. That sale realized an excess of approximately $1.8 mil-
lion.
Banco Nacional de Cuba brought suit in Federal District
Court to recover this excess. First National City, as setoff and
counterclaim, asserted its right to damages from the expro-
priation of its Cuban properties. 4 The District Court granted
summary judgment to First National City, holding that the Hick-
enlooper Amendment overruled Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, the Supreme Court's definitive application of the
act of state doctrine to the Cuban expropriations, and that the
expropriation of the banking facilities violated international
law.5
Banco Nacional appealed.6 Meanwhile, the parties stipulated
1 The loan was initially extended to Banco de Desarrallo Economico y
Social (Bandes), a corporate agency of the Republic of Cuba. The loan
collateral was pledged by Banco Nacional and Fondo de Establizacion
de la Moneda (Fondo). Subsequently, Bandes was dissolved by the
Cuban government, and Banco Nacional succeeded to many of its rights
and obligations, including the obligation to pay the loan. The Republic
of Cuba also guaranteed the loan; for the purposes of this litigation,
Banco Nacional was assumed by the courts to be the agent of the Cuban
government.
2 January 1, 1959. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1959, § 1 at 1, col. 1.
3 Under Executive Power Resolution No. 2 issued pursuant to Cuban
Law No. 851, July 6, 1960; this resolution is set out in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
4 Id. at 1004 et seq.
5 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); the Hicken-
looper (Sabbatino) Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,
22 U.S.C. . 2370(e) (2), formerly pt. III, ch. 1, § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat.
1013 (1964), was intended to limit the scope of the Sabbatino decision.
6431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
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that First National City's counterclaim was not in excess of the
$1.8 million claim brought by Banco Nacional. 7 With this proviso,
the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision and
ruled that the act of state doctrine barred the counterclaim.
According to the Appeals Court, Congress intended the Hicken-
looper Amendment to apply to expropriated property subse-
quently marketed in the United States, in order to prevent
this country from becoming a "thieves' market."8 The Court
added that reading the Hickenlooper Amendment as an over-
ruling of Sabbatino would vitiate the effectiveness of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission by allowing First National City
a windfall at the expense of other creditors.'
It was First National City's turn to appeal.10 As it took
its case to the Supreme Court, the Department of State issued
a letter urging the Judiciary to ignore the act of state doctrine
in "this or like cases."" The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and vacated the Court of Appeals judgment for consideration
of the State Department's views. 12 The Court of Appeals adhered
to its original judgment in a split decision. '3 The Supreme Court
again granted certiorari.'
4
A complex decision by the Supreme Court allowed First
National City's counterclaim and reversed the ruling of the
Court of Appeals.'5 Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment;
the Chief Justice and Justice White joined in his opinion, which
cited with approval the so-called Bernstein exception to the
act of state doctrine. Justice Douglas and Justice Powell each
7First National City Bank reduced its counterclaim from the alleged
value of its Cuban properties to the amount sought by Banco Nacional,
apparently to avoid a sovereign immunity argument based on a coun-
terclaim exceeding the plaintiff's claim.
8 431 F.2d at 399-402.
9 Id. at 403-04.
10 In petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, First National
City Bank argued that Sabbatino was inapplicable to a counterclaim off-
setting Banco Nacional's claim; that the act of state doctrine did not
control the case; that the Hickenlooper Amendment was a proper basis
for finding against Banco NM.cional; and that the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949 should not have barred the counterclaim. 10
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 56 (1971). After the issuance of the "Stevenson
letter", First National City Bank added the Bernstein exception to its
panoply of arguments in its brief before the Supreme Court, 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 30 (1972).
]'The letter, issued by John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor to the Depart-
ment of State, is reproduced in the Court of Appeals' second opinion,
442 F.2d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 1971) and in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 89
(1971).
12400 U.S. 1019 (1971); vacating the judgment of the Ccurt of Appeals,
the Supreme Court expressed "no views on the merits of the case."
1:1 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
14 404 U.S. 820 (1971).
15 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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concurred in separate opinions on distinct grounds. The four
remaining Justices dissented in a lengthy opinion by Justice
Brennan.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba raises
difficult questions, none of which the Court adequately answers.
The case represents an incursion on the Court's prior ruling
in Sabbatino, which articulated the status of the act of state
doctrine. It is unclear whether the incursion is based on the
Bernstein exception or on a dubious comparison with sovereign
immunity. More fundamentally, First National City Bank is
rich in controversy about the justiciability of "political ques-
tions" arising from acts of foreign countries. The following
analysis considers these issues in light of the case's most evident
characteristic: fundamental disagreement among the Justices
over basic questions of jurisprudence.
I. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK AS A QUALIFICATION OF SABBATINO
Chief Justice Fuller's remarks in Underhill v. Hernandez
constitute the traditional American expression of the act of
state doctrine:
Every soverign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by rea-
son of such acts must be obtained through the means open to
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.16
The principle's apparent clarity obscures the often confusing
history of its application. Although frequently invoked, the
doctrine has rarely been essential to the holding of a case.'
7
While it is generally assumed to be a rule of conflict of laws,
it has been associated with substantive international law as
well.18
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court
16 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See generally, Hen-
kin, Act of State Today: Recollection,; in Tranquility, 6 COLum. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 175 (1967); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L
L. 826 (1959); Note, The Castro Government in American Courts:
Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARv. L. REV.
1607 (1962).
17 See, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 304 (1918); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937);
United States v. Belmont. 201 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink
315 U.S. 203 (1942). Although Oetjen and Ricaud reaffirmed Underhili
in unequivocal terms, Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino persuasively
argued that these cases only peripherally involved the act of state
doctrine. 376 U.S. at 442, n.2.
IL Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), stay denied, 314
F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963), rehearing
denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963).
1973
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finally met the act of state doctrine head on. Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court in an 8-1 decision, adhered to the act
of state doctrine in disallowing an original claim against Banco
Nacional based upon Cuba's expropriation of sugar.'"
At the heart of the Sabbatino decision is its discussion of the
varied roles played by the act of state doctrine. The doctrine
exercises a distributive function by allocating authority and
control between the Executive and the Judiciary in the conduct
of foreign policy; simultaneously, it assumes a regulative task
as a principle of comity among sovereign states.211 Despite its
importance, the doctrine is less than a hard and fast legal rule:
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on
federal and state courts alike but compelled by neither inter-
national law nor the Corstitution, its continuing vitality depends
on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government
on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.
21
The act of state doctrine, far from precluding judicial in-
quiry into the validity of a foreign state's conduct within its own
borders, supervenes only in the absence of firm agreement be-
tween nations on controlling legal principles. To avoid appli-
cation of the doctrine, agreement must constitute more than
customary international law. The Sabbatino decision continued:
... rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and
all-encompassing rule in this case we decide only that the Judi-
cial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in
absence of a treaty or other ambiguous agreement regarding con-
trolling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law.
22
Sabbatino encourages flexible balancing of interests in light
of current developments in international law. If international
19) The facts of the Sabbatino case were rather peculiar. Farr, Whitlock &
Co., an American commodity broker, contracted to purchase Cuban
sugar ultimately bound for Morocco. The sugar was owned by the sub-
sidiary of a Cuban corporation, principally owned by American share-
holders. Before being shipped, the sugar was nationalized by Cuba.
Farr, Whitlock then renegotiated the contract of sale this time promis-
ing to pay the Cuban government. Banco Nacional de Cuba subse-
quently presented the shipping documents and a sight draft for $175,000
to Farr, Whitlock for payment. Farr, Whitlock, however, had entered
into an agreement with the former owner of the sugar not to turn the
funds over to the Cuban government. The funds were later transferred
to Sabbatino, the receiver for the former Cuban owner's assets. 376
U.S. at 401-07. In effect, the former owners had resorted to a self-help
remedy, facilitated by the fortuitous appearance of the assets in cash
form in New York. The Supreme Court sought to discourage such a
remedy. Id. at 438.
211 Id. at 427-37.
"' Id. at 427-28.
22 Id. at 428.
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law has not developed to the point of firm agreement between
the parties, the Court ought to apply the act of state doctrine
rather than preempt the State Department in its conduct of
foreign policy.
Justice White, the lone dissenter in Sabbatino, reached a
conclusion similar to Justice Harlan's. 23 The dissent also decried
inflexible operation of the act of state doctrine, but seemed
convinced that the international law of expropriation is well-
developed. Traditionally, international law imposes a triad of
conditions to which any expropriation must conform: it must
serve some public purpose, there must be nondiscrimination
in the taking, and compensation must be fair and prompt.
24
Justice White relied on this traditional view; however, Justice
Harlan relegated these requirements to the status of customary
international law, which he contended was insufficient to pre-
clude application of the act of state doctrine. 25 He noted that
many countries, especially expropriating countries, might con-
tend that an American court's application of these traditional
requirements would actually constitute advancement of imperial
interests of capital-exporting countries under the guise of in-
ternational law. As Professor Falk has suggested, Justice White's
dissent not only attacks the straw man of a supposedly in-
flexible act of state doctrine, but also fails to prove adequately
that the Cuban expropriation was sufficiently within the ambit
of international law to preclude application of the doctrine.
26
Sabbatino challenges the Judiciary to consider in each case
whether international law is sufficiently well-developed to jus-
tify departure from the act of state doctrine. First National
City Bank fails to meet this challenge. Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion purports to distinguish the Court's position from Sabbatino
because of the presence in First National City Bank of an ex-
pression of State Department policy.27 This distinction is at-
tempted by citing Sabbatino in which Justice Harlan noted,
"[t]his Court has never had occasion to pass upon the so-called
23 Id. at 439-42.
24 See, RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §' 185
et seq. (1962). Traditionai statements of these rules in older sources
are cited at length in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 60, n.4.
25 376 U.S. at 457-61.
; FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL Sociry 413-17 (1970).
Falk's position has been criticized in Klein, An Examination of the
Competence of National Courts to Prescribe and Apply International
Law: The Sabbatino Case Revisited, 1 U. OF SAN FRAN. L. REV. 49
(1966).
27 406 U.S. at 768-70.
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Bernstein exception, nor need it do so now. '28 In First Na-
tional City Bank such an exception does appear in the
form of the "Stevenson letter" (see II., infra) .29 Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the function of the act of state doc-
trine is to lend judicial expression to the Executive's lead in the
conduct of foreign affairs..34 1 Where the act of state doctrine
serves American policy, it should be applied; where the State
Department makes clear that American policy is not benefitted
by application of the doctrine, it should be cast aside. Whether
the international law of expropriation is well-developed or not
seemed irrelevant to the First National City Bank Court. In
effect, Sabbatino urged adoption of the act of state doctrine
where no clearly controlling, mutually agreed upon transnational
legal principles existed. However, First National City Bank
intimates that the criterion for discarding the act of state doc-
trine is benefit to American foreign policy as articulated by
the Department of State, without regard to the presence or lack
of controlling principles of international law.31 Summing up his
position, in which the Chief Justice and Justice White joined,
Justice Rehnquist concluded:
We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it is
with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs,
expressly represents to the Court that the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy,
that doctrine should not be applied by the courts. In so doing,
we of course adopt and approve the so-called Bernstein excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine.
32
To avoid casting the Judiciary in the role of handmaiden
to the State Department, however, Justice Rehnquist further
distinguished First National City Bank from Sabbatino on the
basis of a dubious analogy between the act of state doctrine
and sovereign immunity. He noted that, "[o] ur holding is in no
sense an abdication of the judicial function to the Executive
Branch.'33 Since he believed the only reason for the act of state
doctrine to be avoidance of conflict with the State Department's
conduct of foreign policy, he concluded that when the danger
is absent, the case ought to be adjudicated on the merits. There-
fore, First National City Bank was allowed to press its counter-
claim without regard to either sovereign immunity or the act
28 376 U.S. at 420.
29 442 F.2d at 536.
30 406 U.S. at 766-68.
31 Id. at 782-84.
32 Id. at 768.
33 Id.
of state doctrine, relying on the principles of equity in National
City Bank v. Republic of China.
3 4
Out of this same concern, Justice Douglas, in his con-
curring opinion, formulated the theory that the act of state
doctrine, like sovereign immunity, is inapplicable to counter-
claims not in excess of the foreign state's original claim:
If the amount of the setoff exceeds the asserted claim, then we
would have a Sabbatino type of case. There the fund in con-
troversy was the proceeds of sugar which Cuba had national-
ized. Sabbatino held that the issue of who was the rightful
claimant was a "political question", as its resolution would result
in ideological and political clashes between nations which must
be resolved by the other branches of government. We would
have that type of controversy here, if and to the extent that the
setoff asserted exceeds the amount of Cuba's claim. I would dis-
allow the judicial resolution of that dispute for the reasons
stated in Sabbatino and by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN in the in-
stant case. As he states, the Executive Branch "cannot by simple
stipulation change a political question into a cognizable claim."
5
Clearly, this theory distorts the rationale of Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. Having at first established the paramount importance
of the State Department's opinion on the applicability of the
act of state doctrine, Justice Rehnquist then contended that
where the doctrine is inapplicable, sovereign immunity is un-
available as a defense to a counterclaim not exceeding the plain-
tiff's claim. Justice Douglas, on the other hand, concluded that
"fair dealing" ought to be the governing principle in the first
instance:
• .."fair dealing" requires recognition of any counterclaim or
setoff that eliminates or reduces that claim. It is that principle,
not the Bernstein exception, which should govern here. Other-
wise the Court becomes u mere errand boy for the Executive
which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the
fire, but not others.
30
To Justice Douglas, then, the "Stevenson letter" cannot be
relevant to the Court's reversal in favor of First National City
Bank. (Justice Powell concurred on still other grounds, invok-
ing Justice White's arguments in Sabbatino and refusing to
narrowly adopt the Bernstein exception as the decisive factor.
Discussion of his position is reserved for IV., infra.)
What is one to make of these conflicting opinions? May
First National City Bank be distinguished from Sabbatino on
the basis of the Bernstein exception, or rather because "fair
dealing" requires recognition of counterclaims, even those based
34 National City Bank v. Republic of China, 438 U.S. 456 (1955).
35 406 U.S. at 772.
36 Id. at 772-73.
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upon acts of state? Not only does First National City Bank fail
to answer either question; it is also well off the mark of Justice
Harlan's primary concern in Sabbatino - careful consideration
of the status of international law and application of the act
of state doctrine where a definitive international law of ex-
propriation is lacking.
II. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK AND THE BmNsTEn EXCEPTION
The so-called Bernstein exception to the act of state doc-
trine partially determined the result in First National City
Bank.37 Although given a lease on life in this instance, the
exception's viability remains doubtful. Justice Rehnquist ap-
proved and adopted the Bernstein exception in his opinion;
however, his analogy to sovereign immunity undermined it, and
Justice Brennan's dissent maintained that six Justices explicitly
rejected it."'
The Bernstein exception refers to the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bernstein v. N. V. Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche.3" In that case, "a definitive expression
of Executive policy", in the form of a letter from the Depart-
ment of State, purported to release the Judiciary from act of
state constraints in passing upon the legality of German official
acts during the Nazi period. The Court reversed per curiam
its previous application of the act of state doctrine and held
that the Bernstein letter (from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
Adviser of the Department of State) supervened the doctrine.
40
The "Stevenson letter", First National City Bank's analogue
to the Bernstein letter, attempted to apply State Department
policy to the Cuban expropriations. To bring the Bernstein
exception into play in the Federal courts, John R. Stevenson,
the Department's. legal advisor, wrote that:
The Department of State believes that the act of state doctrine
should not be applied to bar consideration of a defendant's
counterclaim or set-off against the Government of Cuba in this
or like cases.
41
37 It was improper for Justice Rehnquist to state that the holding of the
Court was the adoption of the Bernstein exception, since only three
Justices so held.
38 406 U.S. at 776-77.
39 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954).
40 That letter is reproduced id. at 376; the earlier case denying Bernstein
relief, prior to the issuance of the Department of State letter, recites
the facts of the taking of the property at 173 F.2d 71,75-76 n.8.
41 442 F.2d at 538. The impact of the letter was considered prior to the
Supreme Court's decision at Note, Executive Suggestion and the Act of
State Cases: Implications of the Stevenson Letter in the Citibank Case,
12 HARv. INT'L L. J. 557 (1971).
VOL. 3
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The letter was issued following the first decision of the Court
of Appeals, which found in favor of Banco Nacional. The
Supreme Court returned the case to the Appeals Court, urging
consideration of the State Department position.
In its reconsideration of First National City Bank, the
Second Circuit argued that the "Stevenson letter" failed to
undermine the act of state doctrine:
The Bernstein exception has been an exceedingly narrow one.
Prior to the present case, a "Bernstein letter" has been issued
only once -in the Bernstein case itself. Moreover, the case has
never been followed successfully; it has been relied upon only
twice, and in both of those instances, by lower ccurts whose
decisions were subsequently reversed.42
Emphasizing Bernstein's unique facts, the Court noted that the
letter applied to the acts of a German government no longer
in existence; a government with which the United States had
been at war; and finally, a government that had perpetrated
atrocities arguably violating more than mere customary inter-
national law.43 Moreover:
In Bernstein.. . the balance of the equities was almost entirely
on the side of the party opposing application of the act of state
doctrine, plaintiff, whereas there, as we found in our prior de-
cision in this case, the contrary is true, since First National City
is seeking a windfall at the expense of other creditors.
44
Therefore, the Court concluded:
Bernstein arose out of a unique set of circumstances calling for
a special treatment, and hence should be narrowly construed
and, insofar as possible, limited to its facts.
45
Thus, the Appeals Court forcefully argued that the "Stevenson
letter" was insufficient to revive the so-called Bernstein ex-
ception.
The Supreme Court also rejected the Bernstein exception
in First National City Bank. As noted above, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion rather confused the status of the exception, at one point
calling it the holding of the Court, but failing to come up with
even four justices supporting it. Underlining this confusion,
Justice Brennan stated in his dissent:
42 442 F.2d at 535, citing Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), and Kane v. National Institute of Agrarian
Reform, 18 Fla. Supp. 116 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1961), rev'd, 153 So.2d 40 (Fla.
App. 1963).
43'442 F.2d at 534. Ani interesting question remains whether the act of
state doctrine should have applied in Bernstein even had there been no
letter from the State Department. Did the Nuremberg proceedings
raise the world's condemnation of Nazi genocide to the status of inter-
national law? See generally, KELSEN & TUcKER, PRINCIPLES OF INTR-
NATIONAL LAW 215-220 (2d ed. 1966).
44 442 F.2d at 534-35.
45 Id. at 534.
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The Court today reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit that declined to engraft the so-called
"Bernstein'" exception upon the act of state doctrine ... The
Court, nevertheless, affirms the Court of Appeals rejection of
the "Bernstein" exception. Four of us in this opinion unequivo-
cally take that step, as do MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR.
JUSTICE POWELL in their separate concurring opinions.46
Justice Brennan went on to assert that while Sabbatino tech-
nically reserved the Bernstein question, as Justice Rehnquist
correctly observed, the decision in that case placed considerable
doubt upon the propriety of the exception. 47 As explained above,
Sabbatino essentially held that the act of state doctrine should
apply where no rule of international law agreed upon by the
parties may be applied by the courts; it did not hold that the
act of state doctrine should apply where the Executive fails
to invoke the Bernstein exception.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in First National City
Bank, it was predicted in some quarters that the case would
definitely resolve the proper balance between the Executive
and the Judiciary in matters involving foreign relations.48 This
balance hinges upon whether the question before the Court is
"political" or "legal". 40 Unfortunately, the confusion of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, combined with the specific rejection of
the Bernstein exception by six justices, leaves the matter un-
resolved. Moreover, Justice Brennan noted the undesirable
effect had the exception been adopted:
The "Bernstein" exception relinquishes the function (of deter-
mining whether an issue is a political question) to the Executive
by requiring blind adherence to its requests that foreign acts
of state be reviewed. Conversely, it politicizes the Judiciary.50
The most plausible conclusions to be drawn from First
National City Bank are that 1) the Bernstein exception to the
act of state doctrine is not law; 2) due to the limited applica-
bility of the Bernstein principle, the issuance of a letter from
the State Department invoking it will remain an unlikely
occurrence; and 3) the best guides to the relationship between
the Executive and the Judiciary in foreign affairs are still
Baker v. Carr and Sabbatino, with First National City Bank
merely a confusing and unhelpful footnote.51
4, 406 U.S. at 776-77.
47 Id. at 790.
4 8 Comment, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 409 (1971).
4', See, IV., infra.
-5 406 U.S. at 790.
5 1 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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III. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The most patent instance of confusion in First National City
Bank results from an inappropriate analogy to National City
Bank v. Republic of China,5 2 an earlier case establishing im-
plied waiver of sovereign immunity for a foreign state bringing
an action in this country's courts and subsequently subjected
to a counterclaim based on American law.53 The notion is one
of "fair dealing": if a foreign nation invokes "our law", it is
only fair that he expose himself to counterclaims based on
that law.
5 4
Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted first that the result
reached in First National City Bank is "consonant with the
principles of equity" set forth in Republic of China.55 From
constituting a mere analogy, however, the principle of "fair
dealing" in counterclaims became for Justice Douglas, in his
concurrence, the governing principle of the case, despite the
fact that the counterclaim in Republic of China was based on
sovereign immunity while the one in First National City Bank
hinged upon an act of state.56
Justice Douglas maintained that the concept of "fair deal-
ing" articulated in Republic of China by itself determined the
First National City Bank holding; the act of state doctrine, he
contended, is irrelevant to counterclaims. 57 Although based on
an incorrect analysis, Justice Douglas' view possessed the virtue
of consistency; Justice Rehnquist's, on the other hand, confused
the Bernstein rationale with the "fair dealing" approach.
At issue is the relationship between "fair dealing" and
the act of state doctrine. Should the doctrine bar assertion of a
counterclaim, not otherwise barred by sovereign immunity,
52 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
53 Id. at 364-65.
54 This notion is set out at length in Justice Douglas' concurrence, 406
U.S. at 770-73; general criticism of the sovereign immunity rule itself
is found in Justice Brennan's dissent, supra at 789-90, n.13.
; Id. at 768.
56 Justice Douglas argued that the essential issue was Cuba's desire "to
have its cake and eat it too." Beyond this, he simply failed to analyze
whether the distinction between the types of counterclaims asserted in
the two cases was at all relevant.
57 Curiously, Chief Justice Burger had himself employed this "fair deal-
ing" argument while on the District of Columbia bench, in his dissent
in Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In that
case, a Cuban national, sued by Cuba in American courts, asserted a
counterclaim based on the value of his expropriated property. The
Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the counterclaim; then Judge
Burger's dissent relied heavily on National City Bank. Yet, in First
National City Bank, the Chief Justice found himself in agreement with
Justice Rehnquist, supporting the Bernstein exception and only alluding
to the "fair dealing" argument in passing.
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when the counterclaim arises from an act of state? It seems
that it should, even if the counterclaim does not exceed the
amount of the foreign government's claim.
Determinative of the issue is the crucial difference between
the types of counterclaims asserted in Republic of China and
First National City Bank. In the former case, China's claim was
for recovery of a deposit with National City Bank. The Bank
sought setoff on defaulted Treasury notes in the amount of
China's claim. It should be noted that no issue arose as to the
applicable substantive law in determining the validity of the
counterclaim; the only question was the availability of the
sovereign immunity defense to the Republic of China. 58
The problem is quite different in First National City Bank,
where the counterclaim arose from an alleged act of state.
The analytical first step in the two cases is similar: to decide
that it is equally unfair to bar a counterclaim because of sov-
ereign immunity as it is to bar one because of the act of state
doctrine.
Next, a court must determine what law to apply in evaluat-
ing such counterclaims.5 " At this point the circumstances of
the two cases differ markedly. In Republic of China the default
upon which the counterclaim rested occurred within the United
States; therefore, domestic law was clearly applicable. However,
for the act of state counterclaim there exist no firmly agreed
upon rules of international law that an American court can
apply in determining the validity of Cuban expropriations.
Justice Harlan found this distinction controlling in Sabbatino:
. . immunity relates to the prerogative right not tc have sov-
ereign property subject to suit; fairness has been thought to re-
quire that when the sovereign seeks recovery, it be subject to
legitimate counterclaims against it. The act of state doctrine,
however, although it shares with the immunity doctrine a re-
spect for sovereign states, concerns the limits for determining
the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law.
60
In summary, the essence of the act of state doctrine is its
limitation upon the American Judiciary which prevents the
58 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, noted the es-
sential problem: whether a counterclaim not "based on the subject
matter of a sovereign's suit is allowed to cut into the doctrine of im-
munity." 348 U.S. at 364. He concluded that it is, but said nothing
about the substantive rules a court should apply in assessing the coun-
terclaim. Presumably, there was no doubt that straightforward breach
of contract rules applied in the National City Bank case.
59 In Sabbatino, it was urged that the forum simply apply its own law to




application of American law or customary international law
to acts occurring within Cuba. The "fair dealing" argument
pales in light of the central problem which the act of state
doctrine poses to the courts: are there rules of law that apply
in assessing a counterclaim arising from a foreign state's con-
duct within its own territory? In Republic of China well-de-
veloped rules of domestic law clearly dealt with the default
of an obligation incurred within the jurisdiction of American
courts. In contrast, the act of expropriation which prompted First
National City's counterclaim occurred within Cuba's own terri-
tory, and hence American law did not apply. Furthermore, there
existed no internationally accepted law of expropriation under
which the counterclaim might be adjudicated.
IV. "POLITICAL QUESTIONS" AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
"Political questions", De Tocqueville says, have a habit of
eventually assuming a legal character as society changes.6 1 Ex-
propriation, a "political question" in Sabbatino, could therefore
evolve into a legally cognizable issue.6 2 "Political" acts of state
gradually become justiciable as nations substitute law for paro-
chial self-interest.
To preclude application of the act of state doctrine, inter-
national law must constitute more than notions of comity, cus-
tomary international law, or a generalized concept of political
morality grounded in sovereign states' respect for one another.
As Justice Harlan put it in Sabbatino:
... the greater the degree of codification or consensus concern-
ing a particular area of international law, the more appropriate
it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle
to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of
establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national in-
terest or with international justice
.63
The desired development therefore requires rules of expropria-
tion exerting authority and control over both capital exporting
61 A. DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, (Harper & Row ed. 1966).
For a general discussion of his celebrated thesis distinguishing the politi-
cal from the legal jurisdictions, see, pp. 89-93.
G_ Justice White, dissenting in Sabbatino, felt that the law of expropria-
tion had already achieved the requisite status of binding international
law so as to justify adjudication on the merits. 376 U.S. at 458-59. In
First National City Bank, Justice Powell was of the opinion that even
if the law of expropriation were not well developed, domestic courts
had the duty of furthering its development by adjudicating the case on
the substantive issues, despite the act of state doctrine. 406 U.S. at 775.
63 376 U.S. at 428.
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and capital importing nations.
64
Since expropriation constitutes a "political question", it is
surprising that First National City Bank's counterclaim was held
to be justiciable. The eight years intervening between Sabbatino
and First National City Bank saw no lessening of political tensions
attending expropriations. 65 Evidently three justices felt a com-
bination of the "Stevenson letter" and "fair dealing" rendered
the counterclaim justiciable. A fourth, Justice Douglas, thought
the case did not involve the act of state doctrine because it arose
from a counterclaim. And Justice Powell said the law of ex-
propriation should have been a "legal question" in both cases. " ,
Such diverse opinions expressed by the majority justices,
not to mention the contrary view of the dissenters, confuse the
standards for determining justiciability in act of state cases.
Those standards have never been entirely clear." Advocating an
ad hoc approach, Baker v. Carr noted that:
Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating
analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history
of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility
to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the
specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial
action.
68
In that decision, Justice Brennan stated generally that deter-
mining whether an issue is "political" is a "delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
'69
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Cuban expropriation is
less than delicate. Assuming the raison d'etre of the act of state
doctrine to be advancement of American foreign policy, he con-
cluded that Executive disapproval of the doctrine should be
64 These dual notions of authority and control as determinative components
of the development of international law have been most fully analyzed
by Myres S. McDougal; see McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL
COERCION (1961).
65 The unanswered question is how many of these expropriations or
nationalizations will give rise to lawsuits in the United States. Sovereign
immunity prevents direct claims against foreign states; however, for-
eign assets in the United States combined with collateral claims by the
foreign state against the former American owner of the taken property
may well yield more of these peculiar act of state litigations.
66 406 U.S. at 774-75.
G7 Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion the distinction between
jurisdiction and justiciability, the former concerning the Court's power
over the parties, the latter concerning the appropriateness of the subject
matter for judicial resolution. Thus, the sovereign immunity analogy
provided a jurisdictional basis for allowing the counterclaim against
Cuba, while justiciability was the issue presented by the act of state
doctrine. Id. at 773-74.
"G 369 U.S. at 211-12.
69* Id. at 211.
CASE NOTES
heeded by the Court. As he expressed it, "the reason of the
law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.
' 70
Justice Brennan's dissent labeled this tidy argument "mechan-
ical and fallacious."71 Its fallacy stems from the incorrect view
that the doctrine's function is to facilitate successful conduct of
foreign affairs. The doctrine's purpose is the prevention of
judicial bungling in the political arena.72 Acts of state are gen-
erally "political" because no law exists with which to assess
their validity. However, if law does exist, whether by treaty,
mutual agreement, or multinational convention, the act of state
may be justiciable.7 3 In any case, the Department of State's
view on the national interest should have little relationship
to the Court's determination of the applicability of international
legal standards.
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Curiously, Justice Powell's concurrence is consistent with
both Sabbatino and Justice Trennan's dissent.75 He would have
joined in Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino, contending that
precisely that balancing of considerations pondered by Justice
Harlan and adverted to in Baker v. Carr should have required
discarding the act of state doctrine in the Cuban expropriation
cases. He contended that if no conflict with American foreign
policy exists, the courts have "a duty to determine and apply
the applicable international law."76 He mistakenly assumed an
international law of expropriation exists, apart from non-binding
customary behavior. Justice Powell's concurrence fails to sug-
gest any reliable method for ascertaining appropriate legal stand-
ards concerning expropriation.
To what extent may American courts apply international
law to acts of state? According to Sabbatino, acts of expropria-
tion are justiciable if international law is codified or unam-
biguous. However, claims based on a foreign nation's conduct are
"political" insofar as that behavior is subject only to customary
international law. First National City Bank adds that counter-
claims arising from acts of state may be justiciable even in the
absence of a dispositive law of expropriation. In effect, First
70 406 U.S. at 768.
71 Id. at 778.
72 Id. at 785,792-93.
73 376 U.S. at 428.
7N 406 U.S. at 783-85; 376 U.S. at 432-33.
Justice Powell believed that the viewpoint of the Department of State
is only one of many factors determining justiciability of an act of state.
Like Justice White in Sabbatino, he contended that the Cuban expro-
priations constituted an area where domestic courts should be in-
strumental in developing international law.
76 Id. at 776.
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National City Bank's consideration of the Bernstein exception and
the "fair dealing" argument obscures the role of international
law in determining justiciability of acts of state.
V. CONCLUSION
The internal contradictions of First National City Bank char-
acterize a Supreme Court badly split over fundamental questions
of judicial philosophy. Justice Rehnquist's opinion purports to
adopt the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine. Read
closely, the opinion merely suggests that the Court should pro-
ceed case by case to determine the applicability of the act of
state doctrine. The dissent explicitly states that the four dis-
senters, as well as Justices Douglas and Powell in their concur-
rences, reject the Bernstein exception. Thus, the case offers a
confusing and rather unreliable guide to future litigation in the
act of state arena.
he important issue of justiciability raised by First National
City Bank is still more ccnfusing. It is safe to say that the Jus-
tices agree, as might be expected from ' Baker v. Carr, that some
foreign relations problems are not "political questions" and are
therefore cognizable in American courts. But what determining
factors does the Court set forth? Justice Rehnquist argues that
the Department of State's opinion on whether the act of state
doctrine serves in a particular instance to advance American
foreign policy controls justiciability of the issue. Justice Bren-
nan, on the other hand, looks to a myriad of factors, among which
the state of development of international law predominates. Jus-
tice Douglas says the existence of a counterclaim is the key to
justiciability of acts of state; but Justice Powell adopts a middle
position and says justiciability may only be determined case by
case. Hence, the limits of justiciability of acts of state remain ill
defined.
The Sabbatino decision satisfied many commentators that
relative clarity had been achieved for the act of state doctrine.
Dabbling with that doctrine in First National City Bank, the
Supreme Court muddied the waters once again.
Greg Abbott
